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Introduction
A well-established branch of the literature indicates that religion has an important role in shaping the economic behavior of both individuals and organizations (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Lehrer, 2004; Vitell, 2009; Abdelsalam and El-Komi, 2014; Leventis et al., 2016) . Within the realm of accounting, for instance, religiosity appears to operate as an institutionalized control mechanism that influences managerial decisions on corporate financial reporting (Callen and Fang, 2013) . While the impact of religious social norms on economic behavior has been discussed in advanced financial contexts, such as in the United States (Callen and Fang, 2013) , this issue has received little attention in emerging economies with prevailing Islamic religious norms.
An ideal setting for such an investigation is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
A distinguishing institutional characteristic of the MENA region is the strong influence that religion has on the banking sector. This region has the highest concentration of Islamic banks in the world (PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2012; Thomson Reuters, 2015) . 1 These banks are founded on strict religious principles, which shape their rules and codes of practice.
2 The Islamic finance industry is approaching $2.5 trillion in worth, and its value is growing at a phenomenal rate (Ernst and Young, 2015) .
The developmental role of banks assumes transparent and credible financial reporting.
Therefore, questions about the quality of financial information undermine the contribution of banks to the proper functioning of the financial markets (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Callen and Fang, 2013 ). In the current study, we investigate whether organizational religiosity significantly affects the quality of financial reporting. The importance of this investigation extends beyond our sample and responds to prior calls for further research on the role of social norms and culture (i.e., values extracted from religious scriptures) on core economic matters (Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2005) .
1 The regions' Islamic banks represent 50% (US$2,766,510) of the total assets of Islamic banks ($5,533,020) in the 22 countries that have a dual banking system (conventional and Islamic banks). This is based on 10 years ' (2003-2012) data accessed through the Bureau VAN DIJK Bankscope database. 2 We refer to Islamic banks throughout our discussions as those banks that follow Shariah (Islamic jurisprudence) in their business transactions.
Islamic banks are based on a constrained 3 model of finance that prohibits Riba (usury), Gharar (excessive uncertainty), and Maysir (speculations) and encourages the sharing of profits, losses, and risks. The constraints of the Islamic banking model imply the existence of two directions for agency costs. On the one hand, depositors in Islamic banks are contracted as investment account holders (IAHs). In practice, however, Islamic banks' managers have full control over the investment of depositors' funds; IAHs lack board representation and cannot directly monitor bank performance. The absence of IAHs'
representation on the board of directors is an additional agency cost borne by the depositors. On the other hand, the religious adherence of Islamic banks implies a possible reduction in agency costs through organizational moral accountability constraints.
Previous literature argues that the opportunistic behavior of corporate actors (i.e., managers) may be suppressed within an environment that incorporates organizational moral values (Kaptein, 2011; Ha-Brookshire, 2015) . Islamic banks are also subject to an extra layer of governance represented by the Shariah supervisory board 4 (SSB). The SSB approves and reports on Islamic banks' compliance with moral values. Moreover, the concept of Islamic accountability extends the moral responsibility of the managers and board members of Islamic banks beyond conventional legal liability (Beekun and Badawi, 2005; Belal et al., 2015) .
Against this background, we examine the impact of organizational religiosity on the quality of financial reporting by banks in the MENA region. We use accounting conservatism 5 and earnings management (manipulation) 6 as measures of accounting quality. Our sample comprises 600 observations of listed banks in the MENA region during [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . Our empirical results show that Islamic banks are more conservative and less prone to earnings management. Our results also reveal that these banks are 3 In addition, these banks are not permitted to invest in businesses with core products or activities that are impermissible in Islam, such as alcohol, pork, weapons of mass destruction, gambling, adult entertainment products, and cloning. 4 The SSB contains scholars holding specialist religious knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence. The SSB's main duties include: (i) introducing the Shariah guidance for conducting banking business, (ii) issuing a statement in the annual report on whether the bank has been conducting its business in compliance with Shariah, and (iii) highlighting any breaches of Shariah rules. 5 Accounting conservatism specifies a higher threshold for recognizing gains and a lower one for recognizing losses, with the aim of reporting strict profits and net assets (Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009) . 6 Earnings management indicates the use of subjective judgment by management in financial reporting and in structuring transactions in ways that alter financial reports either to mislead (conceal) the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy et al., 1999) . more likely to employ the four largest international audit firms (the Big Four) to conduct audits compared with their conventional counterparts, which signals higher quality of audits. We conclude that Islamic banks operate within a governance framework that enhances financial reporting quality.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we demonstrate the importance of organizational religiosity on managerial decision-making in less-developed capital markets in which institutional monitoring and enforcement devices are generally relatively weak. Secondly, our findings that religious norms operate as a significant monitoring mechanism extend what is known on how social norms can affect core economic matters, with particular implications for global regulations (e.g., auditing, enforcement of financial reporting). Finally, our study furthers the current debate on the role of religion with regard to accountability, transparency, and business ethics.
Our findings highlight important implications for investors and auditors in the global banking industry. Investors should be aware that additional institutional factors (i.e., organizational religiosity) are associated with enhanced financial reporting quality and reduced agency costs. Auditors may regard the operation of religiosity as a monitoring mechanism and adjust the depth and the width of their audit procedures accordingly (Leventis et al., 2016) . Finally, regulators should account for the relationship between religiosity and financial reporting quality when attempting to regulate the global banking industry (see Guiso et al., 2006) . Based on the results of the current study, managers of conventional banks operating in the MENA region need to increase the quality of their financial reporting. This goal can be achieved with additional and/or stronger corporate governance mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the theoretical background and develops testable hypotheses. The third section presents the data selection and methodology used. The fourth section demonstrates the empirical findings and sensitivity analysis. The final section concludes the paper.
Theoretical background and hypotheses development
Islamic banks are substantially different from conventional banks in terms of finance models, investment modes, and contracts (see Table 1 ). These differences significantly affect their corporate governance structures, agency conflicts, and overall accountability.
INSERT industry. An underlying reason for this circumstance is generally related to the complex agent-principal (manager-shareholder) relationship and to the unique governance structure in banks (Leventis et al., 2013) . Thus, agency costs are expected to be more pronounced in banks because of a high level of opacity in contractual and reporting practices (i.e., the unobserved quality of loan portfolios) (Mülbert, 2009) , excessive risk-taking behavior given the highly leveraged cost structures (Mehran et al., 2011) , and greater information asymmetries between insiders (managers) and outsiders (stakeholders) (Morgan, 2002) . These interrelated qualities make bank performance difficult to monitor (Levine, 2004; Leventis et al., 2013) . Furthermore, government bailouts and deposit insurance funds tend to provide greater leeway for banks to engage in excessive risk taking or more reckless economic behavior because both moral hazard and regulatory penalties are low (Macey and O'Hara, 2003) .
Overall, the peculiarities of banking operations generate multiple agency costs and weaken the effectiveness of several governance mechanisms to mitigate them. Agency conflicts are even more complex within the context of Islamic banking. In addition to the traditional conflicts, that is, agent-principal, majority-minority shareholding, and shareholders-creditors (see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Smith, 1985; Bowie and Freeman, 1992; La Porta et al., 1999) , Islamic banks face other conflict: the one between the depositors and the managers. This conflict instigates further agency costs and increased legal liability for managers in these banks. Since Islamic banks are prohibited from charging interest, which is considered usury, depositors are contracted as IAHs through an equity-based investment contract (Mudarabah). This contract requires profits from investments to be shared between the bank and the IAHs according to a mutually agreed-upon proportion. Investment losses are completely borne by the IAHs (depositors) unless they arise from misconduct or negligence by the bank (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Belal et al., 2015) . In practice, the majority of Islamic banks do not empower IAHs to directly monitor their investment through representation on the board of directors. This increases the risk of exploitation of the IAHs by the bank managers (Abdel Karim and Archer, 2002) and may heighten their agency costs.
Because the IAHs cannot directly monitor their investment funds, they must track them indirectly through published financial information.
The depositor-manager conflict implies additional agency costs in Islamic banks and highlights a greater need to strictly control for bias in financial reporting, which serves as one of the main sources of information for IAHs (Abdel Karim and Archer, 2002; Chapra and Ahmed, 2002) . On the other hand, previous research argues that organizational religiosity induces social norms 7 that suppress opportunistic behavior of bank managers (Weaver and Agle, 2002) . Religiously oriented organizations are expected to follow strict moral constraints that shape the particular context of their economic operations. These constraints are also expected to enhance organizational morality. Previous literature argues that when corporations have well-defined moral guidelines or structures that all members can easily follow, the morally responsible behavior of individuals within the corporations improves (Kaptein, 2011; HaBrookshire, 2015) .
In addition, the religious concept of Islamic accountability extends the moral accountability of Islamic banks' actors (managers, board of directors, and SSB members) beyond their legal liability. This accountability compels these actors to pursue the best interests of the bank's wider stakeholders as well as to maximize the value of the shareholders' and depositors' (IAHs') investments and to protect them (see Beekun and Badawi, 2005; Belal et al., 2015) . These actions fulfill the religious obligation of Amana (trust), which requires the banks' actors to behave according to 7 Social norms are the external rules "shared by a group, sustained both by sanctions and by emotions of guilt and shame, whose primary characteristic is that it enjoins its followers to forgo selfish benefits in the name of group benefits" (Festre, 2010, p. 514) . Individuals tend to comply with the understandings and expectations of their peer groups to avoid sanctions associated with non-adherence to prevailing values and beliefs. Moreover, accepted attitudes are usually rewarded with social approval and strong community support (Leventis et al., 2013) . Prior literature demonstrates that economic behavior actually depends on the beliefs or actions of the community (Romer, 1984) . In this sense, social norms constitute the main driving forces or motivational mechanisms for market participants (Dyreng et al., 2012) .
the principles of Adl (justice), Qist (balance), and Ihsaan (perfection) (Beekun and Badawi, 2005 Moreover, all Islamic banks appoint an SSB, which operates as an additional governance mechanism. The SSB's primary objective is to ensure that Islamic banks operate in accordance with the ethos of Shariah (Beekun and Badawi, 2005) . The existence of this second layer of governance is expected to additionally limit opportunities for financial misstatements and consequently moderate the higher agency costs in Islamic banks (Mensah, 2014) . Figure 1 illustrates the governance framework of Islamic banks and the interactions between a bank's various actors (i.e., managers, the board of directors, and the SSB) and its major stakeholders (i.e., depositors, creditors, and shareholders). It also depicts the impact of organizational religiosity on agency costs and the reporting behavior of Islamic banks.
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Against this theoretical framework, we expect that Islamic banks may exhibit important differences from conventional banks in terms of earnings management and accounting conservatism. To measure the quality of financial reporting (Walker, 2013) , we develop testable hypotheses on conservatism and earnings management respectively.
Conservatism is an important valuation concept in accounting because it requires one to proceed cautiously if the measurement of financial numbers is uncertain (Epstein and Jermakowicz, 2007) . According to Basu (1997) , conservatism calls for a higher verifiability threshold for recognizing gains compared to losses. Conservatism is beneficial for financial statements because it reduces managerial opportunism, mitigates agency problems associated with managerial investment decisions (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Basu, 2005) , enables efficient debt agreements in the context of asymmetric information (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; García Lara et al., 2009) , reduces litigation, and assists in the efficient valuation of claims (LaFond and Watts, 2008) .
Thus, conservatism motivates managers to cut losses earlier and abandon poorly performing projects (García-Lara et al., 2009 ).
Accounting conservatism can be particularly important for banks because of the sector's complexities, intense information asymmetries, opacity, and contracting particularities (Levine, 2004; Leventis et al., 2013) . Regulators prefer conservative financial reporting by firms to avoid complications or litigation if they become insolvent (Watts, 2003) . In particular, central bankers prefer prudent practices, such as increased loan provisions, during economic upturns (Turner, 1997; Leventis et al., 2013) .
Religious organizations are likely to be more conservative and risk averse than other organizations (Osoba, 2003; Hilary and Hu, 2009 ). The double-layer governance and the moral accountability constraints of Islamic banks' managers are expected to moderate the higher agency conflicts in these banks. These managers are expected to operate in ways that avoid excessive social and moral costs (Callen and Fang, 2013; Belal et al., 2015) , and therefore they are less likely to withhold bad news for personal gain. Accordingly, we hypothesize that H1: Islamic banks are more conservative than conventional banks in their financial reporting practices. Scheiner (1981) provides evidence that banks employ loan loss provisions (LLPs)
as an important tool for earnings management. Also, Ma (1988) and Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) report that bank managers tend to raise LLPs during periods of high operating income in order to decrease the volatility of reported earnings. This conclusion is also supported by several studies focusing on the U.S. banking industry (see Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Liu et al., 1997; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Wahlen, 1994; Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012) , which all conclude that banks use LLPs as a tool for aggressive earnings management (manipulation). Studies using non-U.S. bank samples arrive at similar conclusions (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Perez et al., 2008) . Beatty et al. (2002) demonstrate that banks, in addition to using LLPs, manage reported earnings by manipulating security gains and losses. Shrieves and Dahl (2003) and Agarwal et al. (2007) conclude that Japanese banks used security gains and LLPs to manage earnings during 1985 . Hazera (2005 Consequently, we argue that religiously oriented banks are less likely than conventional banks to manipulate both the flow and the quality of corporate information (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Callen and Fang, 2013) . Therefore, organizational religiosity acts as a powerful deterrent to making accounting misstatements and availing of earnings management opportunities. We thus argue that Islamic banks operating under strict religious norms report financial numbers of enhanced quality as measured by lower earnings management. Our second research hypothesis is formed as follows:
H2: Islamic banks are associated with lower earnings management compared to conventional banks.
Data and methodology

Data selection procedure
To test our predictions, we focused on the MENA region, which has the highest concentration of Islamic banks in the world. Drawing upon different data sets, namely, Datastream, Thomson Reuters' Zawya, and Bloomberg, we found 158 listed banks in the MENA region. These banks were further filtered considering (a) availability of corporate governance (i.e., board of directors and ownership structure) data for the entire period under investigation (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) and (b) availability of at least four banks in each country included for analysis (Beck et al., 2013 Zawya. The final sample distribution is presented in Appendix A.
Measuring accounting conservatism
Our first measure of accounting quality refers to accounting conservatism, represented by the timely recognition of LLPs relative to non-performing loans (Leventis et al., 2013) . Nichols et al. (2009) argue that a bank's loan loss accounting reflects its credit risk management behavior and can create substantial information asymmetry between management and shareholders. Within this framework, LLPs are expenses reflecting managers' valuation of future loan losses. Thus, banks that engage in conservative accounting recognize LLPs that are larger and in more timely manner relative to the variations in non-performing loans (Nichols et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2013) . To test for the differences in the timeliness of Islamic banks and conventional banks in recognizing LLPs, we followed Nichols et al. (2009) and Leventis et al. (2013) by associating LLPs with lagged, contemporaneous, and future changes in nonperforming loans (ΔNPLit-1, ΔNPLt, and ΔNPLit+1, respectively) 8 . We controlled for differences in loan charge-offs 9 for both current (LCOit) and future years (LCOit+1), and we formalized this test by estimating Ball and Shivakumar's (2005) Where: LLPs = ratio of loan loss provisions for year t to total loans in year t-1 ΔNPL = change in non-performing loans between two years, deflated by total loans in year t-1 LCO = loan charge-offs for year t, deflated by total loans in year t-1 performing loans compared to conventional banks. Consistent with prior studies (Nichols et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2013) , we expect the coefficients a1, a2, a3, a4, and a5 on ΔNPLit-1, ΔNPLit, ΔNPLit+1, LCOit, and LCOit+1 to have positive signs. We expect the lagged present and future changes in non-performing loans (ΔNPLit-1, ΔNPLit, and ΔNPLit+1) to be positively related to LLPs (Kanagaretnam et al., 2010) . We also expect net loan charge-offs (LCOit, and LCOit+1) to be positively related to LLPs because loan charge-offs provide information about the future collectability of loans (see Beaver and Engel, 1996; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010) . Although the Nichols et al. (2009) model requires continuous time-series data, which constrains the sample size (Beatty and Liao, 2011) , it is the most appropriate research design for measuring conservatism in the banking industry (Leventis et al., 2013) .
Measuring earnings management
Following Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) , we employ three different metrics for earnings management. The first measure identifies small positive income as a target of earnings management. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , Leuz et al. (2003) , and Barth et al. (2008) use the frequency of small positive net income as an indicator of managing earnings. The underlying expectation is that managers aim to report a small positive net income rather than negative net income for various reasons, such as the manipulation of the stock market, avoidance of debt covenants, and even the achievement of earnings targets for receiving bonuses (Leventis et al., 2013) . Based on hypothesis 2, we expect
Islamic banks to report a small positive net income less frequently than conventional banks.
To test this assertion, we followed Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , Lang et al. (2003) , and Barth et al. (2008) and estimated a dummy variable SPOS that equals 1 if net income deflated by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01 for each given year, and 0 otherwise. We then introduced SPOS as the dependent variable in the following logit regression model:
Where: EBT = earnings before taxes deflated by lagged total assets. The remaining variables are as previously defined.
A negative coefficient on the IBsit*EBTit variable indicates that Islamic banks report small positive income less frequently than conventional banks.
Our second metric for earnings management is based on using LLPs and realized security gains and losses as mechanisms for aggressive earnings management (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Beatty et al., 2002; Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012) . LLPs and realized security gains and losses combine a nondiscretionary component, which brings loan loss allowances to an acceptable level, and a discretionary portion, which is closely regulated (Cornett et al., 2009) . Therefore, in order to produce a salient estimate of the earnings management behavior of banks via the manipulation of LLPs, we estimated the discretionary part of LLPs and realized security gains and losses. We followed Cornett et al. (2009) and Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) The error term of regression (b) is the discretionary part of the realized security gains and losses. Our measure of earnings management (EM) is the difference between the discretionary part of RSGL and the discretionary part of LLPs. Higher levels of EM increase earnings and vice versa; that is, higher levels of EM correspond to increased earnings management.
The EM proxy is estimated from the previous step and introduced as the dependent variable in the following regression model in which all independent variables are defined as before:
We expect a negative coefficient on the IBsit*EBTit variable, which indicates Islamic banks exhibit less aggressive earnings management behavior.
Our third and final measure of earnings management is discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones (1991) model and modified by Yasuda et al. (2004) for banking institutions. We ran the following regression to obtain the discretionary part of the total accruals of the banks:
Where: ACCR = total accruals estimated as the difference between net income and operating cash flows TA = total assets ΔΟI = change in a bank's operating income between t-1 to t BRE = bank's premises and equipment.
All variables and the intercept are deflated with lagged total assets to reduce heteroskedasticity in the error term. The residuals from equation (c) are denoted as the discretionary portion (DACC) of total accruals, which depends on managerial discretion and is our primary variable of interest. In the following step, we introduce it as the dependent variable:
All models include year dummies to capture time-specific effects and to offset the problem of heteroskedasticity in the error term. As in the previous models, we expect a negative coefficient on the IBsit*EBTit variable, which indicates that Islamic banks exhibit a lower magnitude of discretionary accruals and have less earnings management. All the models were tested for potential endogeneity (Kennedy, 2008; Koutsoyiannis, 1977) by applying the Hausman (1978) simultaneity specification test, as suggested by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991) . Our results indicate no serious endogeneity problems: our dependent variable does not lead to biased or inconsistent OLS estimates.
Governance and ownership variables
All the models include variables to reflect governance and ownership structure for both Islamic and conventional banks. According to Brown et al. (2011) , board and ownership structures are significant determinants of accounting quality and managerial accounting choices. For this reason, we introduced variables to reflect CEO duality, board independence, and state and foreign ownership. For definitions see Appendix B.
Some prior literature suggests that CEO duality enhances corporate value through a thorough knowledge of the strategies and the operations of the firm (Brown et al., 2011) . However, where accounting issues are concerned, other literature provides strong evidence that boards independent from the CEO perform their monitoring role and mitigate earnings management behavior better (see Klein, 2002; Mitchell, 2005; Chang and Sun, 2010) . That is to say, CEO duality is associated with more earnings management and less conditional conservatism.
Board independence is measured as the ratio of independent members to total board members. A large body of research shows a strong negative correlation between board independence and earnings management. Marnet (2008) , Klein (2002) , Persons (2006) , Iqbal and Strong (2010) , Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) , and Beekes et al. (2004) all argue that independent boards contribute toward the integrity and quality of financial statements. Consequently, we expect a negative coefficient on that variable in the earnings management models and a positive coefficient in the conservatism Model [1].
In addition, prior literature (Megginson et al., 1994; Wang and Yung, 2011; Shleifer, 1998) demonstrates that state-owned firms are associated with higher earnings management. However, Laidroo (2009) and Wang and Yung (2011) report the opposite effect. Therefore, we form no strong expectation on the impact of state ownership.
Beyond earnings management, state ownership has a significant impact on firms'
accounting conservatism. The general finding is that state ownership has a negative impact on accounting conservatism (Cullinan et al., 2012) .
Finally, we consider foreign ownership. According to Laidroo (2009) , foreign owners tend to be large international firms that operate in several countries. With less of a need to acquire outside financing from the local market, subsidiary firms may have diminished accounting quality. However, Xu et al. (2012) find that internationally owned firms present the highest accounting quality across all types of ownership structure groups (private, state, employee, etc.).
Control variables
Our first control variable is bank size (SIZE), measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Because analysts tend to follow larger banks (Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012) , these banks are less likely to engage in aggressive earnings management (Cornett et al., 2009 ). Thus, we expect a negative coefficient on the SIZE variable for the earnings management models. LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conservatism is less evident for larger firms because they provide more publicly available information and use multiple information dissemination techniques. Givoly et al. (2007) find that asymmetric timeliness of earnings for large firms differs from that of small firms. In contrast, Callen et al. (2010) argue that large firms, facing lower operational uncertainty, demand greater accounting conservatism.
The second control variable is leverage (LEV), which is measured as the ratio of total debt to common equity. Riskier banks may inflate accounting earnings for reasons related to capital adequacy requirements and regulatory scrutiny (Cornett et al., 2009; Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012) . Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on LEV. In addition, we use a control for tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (CAP). Regulators scrutinize capitalized banks less, which allows more opportunities for managing earnings (Cornett et al., 2009 ). However, the managers of low-capitalized firms might have more incentives to manage earnings in order to avoid sanctions. Anandarajan et al. (2007) provide significant results on the impact of CAP on earnings management behavior.
Consequently, the association between capital adequacy and both earnings management and conservatism may not be monotonic. Thus, we cannot infer any predictions about the sign of this coefficient.
We control for banks' growth opportunities using the market-to-book ratio (GRW).
Lai (2009) indicates that firms with increased growth opportunities are less likely to report discretionary accruals, especially when they experience increased monitoring.
Banks are generally more regulated and more closely monitored compared with other institutions, and they may be associated with less earnings management. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on GRW to be negative. Additionally, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that the market-to-book ratio reflects the composition of equity value, which is determined by the investment opportunities of the firm and the past asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Therefore, we expect GRW to have a positive association with conservatism.
We also control for audit quality by including a dummy variable (AUDQ) that indicates that a bank is audited by one of the Big Four audit firms, which are expected to produce high-quality financial statements (Gul et al., 2006; Park and Pincus, 2001 ).
In addition, Leventis et al. (2013) suggest that banks audited by the Big Four audit firms have a higher level of LLPs relative to nonperforming loans, indicating higher conditional conservatism. Consequently, we expect a negative coefficient on this variable for the earnings management models and a positive coefficient for the conservatism model. Furthermore, we control for bank financial performance, measured as net cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets (CFO). High-performing firms that tend to use more conservative accounting (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Leventis et al., 2013) are less motivated to manage their accounting numbers. Accordingly, we expect the coefficient on CFO to be positive for the conservatism model and negative for the earnings management model. We also control for lagged loan loss allowance deflated by total loans (LLAt-1) on the conditional conservatism model since we expect banks with high LLAit-1 to have lower LLPs in the current period (if banks that are over-reserved recognize lower provisions in the next period) (Liu and Ryan, 2006; Leventis et al., 2013) .
Our last set of control variables comprises country-specific variables. The first is a dummy receiving unity (1) 
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Results on conservatism and earnings management
The results from the estimation of Model [1] are presented in Table 4 . The regression Compared to the insignificant EBT coefficient, the IBs*EBT coefficient result can be interpreted as Islamic banks manipulating LLPs and security gains and losses less often to achieve earnings targets. Overall, we argue that the quality of financial reporting of Islamic banks is enhanced by their moral accountability constraints and more broadly religious norms constraints in restricting earnings management.
The variable of state ownership (GOV_OWN) is negative and significant in the SPOS and DACC models. This is consistent with the assumption that an increase in state ownership is associated with less earnings management, either through reporting small positive income or manipulating discretionary accruals. This finding corroborates arguments from prior literature that firms under state ownership have less need for outside financing, which in turn reduces motives for earnings management (Wang and Yung, 2011; Ding et al., 2007; Laidroo, 2009) Regarding the control variables, only SIZE, LEV, and CAP are positive and significant. In addition, banks in GCC countries report relatively higher discretionary accruals than those in non-GCC countries, indicating that banks in GCC countries overstate their earnings. The positive coefficients for LEV and CAP are in accordance with the regulatory capital management theory, and they suggest that riskier banks (high LEV) tend to artificially inflate accounting earnings for reasons related to capital adequacy requirements and regulatory scrutiny (Cornett et al., 2009; Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012) . Furthermore, well-capitalized banks (high CAP) have greater opportunities for earnings management because they undergo less scrutiny by regulators (Cornett et al., 2009 ). Finally, the SIZE coefficient is negative and significant, which aligns with our expectations. This finding supports the argument that small-sized banks engage in manipulative techniques in order to achieve earnings targets that international and local investors and debtors consider appropriate.
The overall results, based on the three tested empirical models for EM, shed light on the influence of the additional governance and the moral accountability constraints within Islamic banks. They act as important mechanisms in mitigating opportunistic behavior and hence, controlling the overall agency costs in these banks compared to their conventional counterparts, which usually operate under a single layer of governance.
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Moreover, we test the impact of bank type on the decision of the auditor selection, as a measure of audit quality (Landsman et al., 2009) . Studies in prior literature argue that auditors influence earnings quality since their role is to restrict incidents of financial misstatement and managerial discretion (Dechow et al., 2010) . We estimate a logit regression model using a dummy (AUDQ) as the dependent variable that receives unity (1) for banks audited by one of the world's four largest international audit firms (Big Four), and zero (0) otherwise. The other variables are the control and governance variables used in the previous models. Therefore, the logit model has the following form:
AUDQit = a0 + a1EBT +a2IBs +a3GOV_OWN +a4FOR_OWN + a5DUAL + a6BODIND + a7SIZE + a8LEV + a9CAPt + a10GRW + a11CFOt
The results are presented in Table 6 . The coefficient for the IBs variable is positive and significant: Islamic banks tend to hire the Big Four audit firms for their statutory audits. This result is in line with the main finding of this study; that is, Islamic banks report earnings of higher quality. These results imply that the auditor selection decision is likely to have a substantial influence on promoting higher earnings quality and conservatism in Islamic banks.
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Sensitivity analyses
We performed 10 sensitivity tests to assess the validity of our findings. In the first test, following Leventis et al. (2013) Table 3 .
Third, following Clinch and Magliolo (1993) , who argue that discretionary LLPs and RSGL should not be combined into a single earnings management variable, we reestimated Model [3] to include discretionary LLPs and realized security gains and losses separately as our measure of earnings management. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Fourth, in order to capture any biases in the estimation of discretionary accruals, we eliminated the upper and lower 1% of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and re-estimated Model [3] as in Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) . This had no significant impact on the main findings.
Fifth, we removed some of the restrictions in the sample selection procedure and included countries that have fewer than four banks in their utilized databases. The results remain relatively unchanged. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the models is significantly reduced, probably due to a higher sample variability.
Sixth, we included additional country-related variables in all models, such as GDP growth, rule of law regulatory quality, government efficiency, and bank concentration ratio to control for additional factors. The results are unaffected.
Seventh, all models were re-estimated after we changed the definition of some control variables. GOV_OWN and FOR_OWN were replaced by dummies receiving unity (1) for those banks that have foreign and state ownership above 50%. SIZE was re-estimated as the logarithm of the market value of equity, and LEV and GRW were re-measured as long-term debt to total assets and the annual percentage change of interest income, respectively. The results are unaffected.
Eighth, we controlled for the impact of the 2011 political turmoil in the Middle East and tested whether it affected the accounting quality of Islamic banks and conventional banks. While the political turmoil was more prevalent in specific MENA counties, we further considered whether its wider impact in this region was more pronounced for specific types of banks and conducted a sensitivity test. Thus, we re-estimated all models after separating the sample into the pre-turmoil ( Ninth, we re-estimated Model [2] by dividing our sample into countries belonging to the GCC group, which are the most affluent in the MENA region, and countries with political turmoil during 2011 and 2013 (i.e., Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia). The findings suggest that only Islamic banks in the countries that experienced political turmoil exercised less income smoothing than conventional banks, a finding that corroborates the result in Table 5 .
Tenth, we controlled for the impact of adopting the incurred loan loss model 10 employed by Islamic banks in Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar as opposed to the expected loan loss model 11 , which is currently proposed by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). We found that Islamic banks seem to report less discretionary accruals and to be more conservative in relation to conventional banks. These results confirm our initial findings on Islamic banks' enhanced earning quality. Also, banks with government ownership are associated with less discretionary accruals; in contrast, conventional banks with foreign ownership manipulate their earnings more often in comparison to Islamic banks.
Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of religious norms on the quality of financial reporting of MENA-listed banks during 2008-2013. We drew upon both agency and social norm theories. We also discussed the unique governance framework of Islamic banks, featuring additional depositor-manager conflict, the extra layer of governance (SSB), and the moral accountability constraints in these banks. In that context, we expected that the opportunistic behavior by corporate actors would be suppressed.
Our main findings demonstrate that Islamic banks are more conservative because they recognize more LLPs relative to non-performing loans and loan charge-offs.
Additionally, Islamic banks are less likely to manage earnings than conventional banks because they are less likely to report small positive income that is close to zero and they report fewer cases of discretionary accruals. Additionally, they engage the Big Four audit firms more frequently.
Accordingly, we suggest that the strict religious orientation of Islamic banks motivates managers to raise the quality of financial reporting and to reduce agency costs for stakeholders, including depositors, creditors, and shareholders.
Our study is of particular importance because of the unique institutional characteristics of the Islamic finance industry, the rapid increase in its size, and the interconnectedness of the global economic system. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we show that religious norms play a major role in influencing managerial decision-making in the context of less-developed capital markets, which are characterized by weak control institutions and relatively ineffective enforcement mechanisms. We also expand the extant literature by moving beyond the U.S. context. Second, our findings substantiate the view that social norms affect financial reporting and auditing at the global level. Finally, we bring to the fore contexts in which Islamic values predominate, illuminating the global role of religious norms in accountability, transparency, and business ethics.
The implications of our research are important for market participants and regulators. Investors and analysts should factor into their analyses the important role of strong religious adherence in improving the quality of financial reporting and reducing agency costs. Moreover, auditors and regulators should view religious adherence and the moral accountability constraints as being complementary mechanisms to statutory auditing; they may therefore, adjust their efforts accordingly.
Our study has certain limitations that create avenues for future research. First, our study is limited to the MENA region, which reduces our ability to generalize important findings. Future researchers could expand on our research to cover Islamic countries in other parts of the world and thereby enrich the understanding offered by this study.
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